Keep Austin Employment Downtown

Julio G. makes the case that Austin's general transit ridership is stagnating and that population decline in the most transit productive areas is to blame.  Part of that comes from NIMBYs and a restrictive development code.  But I would also argue that transit ridership is on the decline because the most productive destination for transit is declining in share as well. 

Employment drives a large percentage of transit ridership and Austin is likely to be no different.  16% of all trips are by transit, but 34% of transit trips (p5) are work trips.  APTA on board surveys have put that number around 59%.

So we can't just think of residential, but rather employment in the region.  We know Austin has been sprawling for some time, but let's look at the numbers.

Julio says that for the last 15 years, population has increased 34% in the region.  Because data from LED is only available from 2002 on, that leaves us with a 13 year period.  But the growth in jobs in that 13 years has been 26% or ~675K to ~852K according to LED data.

But for downtown, which I looked at as West of I-35, North of Barton Springs Road, East of Lamar, and South of MLK employment growth is much smaller.  Only an 18% change, from ~112K in 2002 to ~132K in 2011.   The share of employment that resides in this downtown sector has gone down too.  In 2002 it was 16.5% of total jobs in the region, while in 2011 it was 15.5% of total jobs. 

1% isn't huge, but its enough to show that employment sprawl is a big issue.  And if you depend on employment to drive transit ridership, and your #1 market is losing share, it gets hard to serve. 

So in addition to getting more housing in Austin's core, I would argue that for VMT reduction, getting employment into the core is just as important.  Right now people are driving to Round Rock or 360 or many other places.  Create centers, serve them with good transit, and the ridership will grow. 

Obviously easier said than done.

15 Year Population Change
                               34%
12 Year Employment Change
                               26%
Austin 2002
Regional Jobs -      675K
Downtown Jobs -   112K
Downtown Share - 16.5%

Austin 2011
Regional Jobs -       852K
Downtown Jobs -    132K
Downtown Share -  15.5%

Austin's Rail History & Route Choice Problem Part 1: History

This last week there have been flurries of articles and tweets about a subject that is near and dear to my heart.  Austin's push for rail transit was the reason I started thinking about these issues and part of the reason why I started this blog.  I even wrote my Master's Report (Source of some of the Timeline below) on the politics and history of this movement that has caused so much consternation to local advocates since the early 80s. 

I've written about these issues in Austin many times before. (Alignment, VMT Reduction, and Starter Technology Decisions)   Some of you might be getting sick of my Austin posts, but ultimately the point of this blog is to bring information to the forefront and get folks to think about the decisions they are making about transit and technology.

This is going to be a multi-post series so first let's go through the basics.  Let's do a timeline to catch you up quickly...


1960s -  In the 60's, as happened all over the country, major arterials in cities were slated to become freeways.  While many cities built an initial freeway network and loop roads, Austin's neighborhoods pushed back on getting sliced in half and limited freeway development to two major north/south corridors and East/West corridors that were far away from the city center, making arterial streets the major corridors.  Texas Freeway has historical pictures and documents. This meant that getting east to west in central Austin has to be done on surface streets. 

1973 - The Texas State Legislature, understanding that regions were growing and cities alone were too small a jurisdiction to support regional transit systems, passed a law allowing Metropolitan Areas over 600k people create a Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). At the time Austin did not have enough population.

1981 - Austin lobbies successfully to get State Legislature to allow cities over 325k people to get an MTA.

1983 - An interim agency named the Austin Area Rapid Transit System was created to be the predecessor to the RTA. A Transit service plan created in 1984 consisted of a short and long term plan.  The short term was for increases in bus service as the long term consisted of rail planning. As part of the long term rail planning for the RTA, the agency began discussions to purchase existing freight rights of way from Southern Pacific.  Additionally, there were discussions on forming a Metro Government and a bill was written by Representative Terrel Smith but never filed.

1985 - Replacing the Austin Area Rapid Transit System, Capital Metro Transportation Authority (Capital Metro) was created and given the ability to levy a cent sales tax, which was chosen instead of an emissions tax or a gas tax increase.  The first day of service and the resulting bus parade down congress made a lot of locals angry, and set Capital Metro off on the wrong foot with many at the local level as well as the state. 

1986-87 - Flush with cash from the cent sales tax, Representatives in the Legislature started trying to redistribute half the sales tax value that was being saved up for future rail construction.  Representative Terrel Smith sought to give the half cent back to relieve property taxes in the district.

1989 - Board members voted to reduce the sales tax a quarter cent to quell criticism.  While rail supporters wanted Capital Metro to keep saving for a future rail plan, others such as Travis County wanted the extra money to pay off road debts.

1990 - Funding was allocated to study rail in Austin and the board stated that a referendum would be had if they got a positive outcome from the study.  A referendum was pushed back but CAMPO put rail planning in its long range plan that year.  That very same year was the break out of Austin's growing environmental movement.  Tired of seeing developers ravage the land above the Edwards Aquifer and its recharge zones, Austinites came out in droves to an all night meeting that saw the end of a single Barton Creek Planned Unit Development, but a start to the environmental machine in Austin politics. 

1995 - Planning for a rail line, the board decided to raise the sales tax back up to a cent, which drew criticism from enemies still existing including Gerald Daugherty.  Even though an overwhelming amount of the speakers at the meeting spoke on behalf of the increase, the Austin American Statesman and others criticized the board for not having a referendum in place for rail before making the vote.  The general manager even decided to leave when the Statesman kept going after the agency. 

1997 - Because of accountability issues stemming initially from the board vote on the tax increase, the Legislature decided to restructure Capital Metro's board.  This would not be the only time the board structure would be changed. Instead of a citizen board, it would be populated by elected officials, who would be seen as more accountable to the public.  Additionally, Representative Sherri Greenburg passed a bill in the legislature that would require a referendum before the agency would be allowed to issue debt. At the same time, planning for a commuter rail line that looks like the current one would be studied, as well as others that look a little familiar.

1998 - With a restructured board and possible bills that would strip Capital Metro of its cent sales tax coming at an even faster pace, rail was considered again and consultants came up with the idea for the Green Line, which would go directly through the heart of Austin.  The line was supported more than the Red Line, which would circumvent major destinations downtown but would be cheaper due to its route on existing rights of way.  It was at this point that Capital Metro started officially stashing away money to pay for future rail construction. 

1999 - Capital Metro promised legislators who continued to write bills to take funding away from the agency that they would have a referendum in 2000. Representative Mike Krusee from Round Rock and others including Representative Terry Keel continued to hammer the agency and push bills that would take away funding authority.  Krusee's bill would require a referendum on half of the sales tax, essentially stripping Capital Metro of its ability to save money for rail plans.  This was also the year that Austin Bergstrom Airport was completed and the Mueller Airport, a few miles outside of downtown on the east side was left open for redevelopment. Planning included future stops on a yet to be named rail line.

2000 - The decision was made to have the referendum during the 2000 presidential election, in which Texas' Governor George W. Bush was on the Presidential ballot.  The hard fought contest brought out the anti-rail groups in droves, with Texas getting special visits from Wendell Cox and others to push for the rail line's failure with the hope that the extra money would go to roads.  Kirk Watson, then Mayor even wanted to put road bonds on the ballot to satiate the Road Warriors but anti-rail leaders like Gerald Daugherty wanted rail money for roads, claiming other bond money would be insufficient.

Before the election, the Federal Transit Administration gave its stamp of approval, saying other cities would be in line for New Starts funding behind Austin in the process due to the high ridership drivers.  2025 estimates put the ridership estimate at 37,400 riders (17,000 new).  Consequently, some lines from that FTA PE class (no pun intended) have gone on to be super successful, including Minneapolis' Hiawatha Line, Cleveland's Euclid BRT Line, Denver's T-Rex Line, Houston's Main Street Line, Portland's Interstate Max, and Seattle's Central Link.

But even after choosing the correct route and a majority of City of Austin residents voting for the line, the Capital Metro service area voted against the proposal.  The rail vote lost by less than 2,000 votes in a Presidential Election which had over 300,000 voters.  By that time, Capital Metro had saved over $120m for rail construction. Mike Clark Madison (Who wrote many of the linked to articles above) documented the spatial approval over at the Chronicle.

2001 - After the election, to quell mounting pressure from the legislature, Capital Metro decided to rebate a quarter cent that had been saved up back to the cities for mobility projects.  The agency continued to plan for light rail and a deal was brokered between Representative Krusee, who was the Chair of the Transportation Committee, and Capital Metro which resulted in a bill that would require Capital Metro to rebate the quarter cent until a referendum was passed.  Additionally, Representative Krusee helped to get a bill pass that would establish Regional Mobility Authorities (RMAs) that would give locals more authority to build toll roads. 

2002 - Karen Rae, who had signed on to be Capital Metro's general manager in 1998 and make the push for rail stepped down and Fred Gilliam took on those duties.  Planning for light rail continued with a new name (Rapid Transit Project) however it was decided that a referendum would not be held in 2002 due to a lack of consensus for the project.

2003 -  Representative Krusee, who had been named Chairman of the State Transportation Committee,  had his own ideas about what the next rail plan should look like.  The Austin American Statesman suggested that he would like Capital Metro to stop studying the Green Line corridor and focus on the Red Line, which consultants had chosen against in planning for light rail in 1998.  In 2000, the Austin American Statesman, quoted Krusee as saying "I wish they would be open to alternatives to light rail"  We know now that meant planning for light rail along the best possible corridor would stop and planning for a corridor that went directly to his constituents in Round Rock (which doesn't pay into Capital Metro) would commence. At the same time, Envision Central Texas was having its coming out party as a way for the Austin region to organize itself.  Unfortunately unlike Utah's process, teeth were not present.

2004 - Planning for light rail on the Guadalupe corridor stopped sometime in January.  Campus planners at the University of Texas stated they stopped hearing from Capital Metro at that point.  Route choices considered at the time were down San Jacinto street, on the other side of campus from Guadalupe, because UT considered San Jacinto to be the center of an expanding campus.  The push for rail on the other side of campus would continue to today.  Later discussions from interim CEO Doug Allen in 2009 suggested that there was not enough time to get an adequate cost estimate and firm up engineering before having the election.  He also believed that the line should have been double tracked at a potential cost of $300 million per mile to build it out properly, likely to not have to worry about retrofitting the line at a future date. 

In March of 2004, Commuter Rail was announced the community and Capital Metro planned for a referendum during the Presidential election that fall.  Advocates pushed for streetcar connections and other alternatives, but changes to the commuter rail plan were set by Capital Metro and planners for the agency after a few discussions were not allowed to interact with staff as they wanted to keep the line as bare bones as possible to court a winning vote.  Lee Walker, then Chairman of the board, believed that going over $60m for the cost of the system would be too much for the voters and Representative Krusee hinted at the time that he would be able to get the voting requirements for extensions rescinded if the rail system was kept to just the commuter rail line.  The line passed in a referendum that fall with 62% of the vote (operations began in 2010).  Contrary to the previous election, neighborhood groups on South Congress and others were not as active in opposition because they wouldn't see transit construction on their streets.

Also after the election, the Mueller Airport Master Development Agreement was signed, which would determine the terms of the redevelopment of the airport property that left over a large amount of empty land proximate to downtown.

2005 - The thought in the transit community was that 2004 would be the last chance to pass a rail referendum in Austin.  Once the line was passed, it was believed whether right or wrong, that it could be fixed with extensions and additions such as streetcars.  Capital Metro went on to study streetcars. In addition the the commuter line which was the center piece of the 2004 election, the All Systems Go plan also included BRT corridors and enhancements.  Planning for those corridors began in earnest as well.

2006 - Streetcar planning continued and a route was chosen through an alternatives analysis.  Pushes to get the Mueller redevelopment into the mix created a route the connected downtown with the east side of the state capital full of parking garages, the University down San Jacinto street through the stadium complex and out towards Mueller.  As for Rapid Bus, some finally started to take note that getting the FTA to buy new buses and shelters without giving the line a dedicated lane was not really rapid.  Council Members Brewster McCracken and Lee Leffingwell pushed back on the idea and asked the agency more questions. 

2007-08 - CAMPO, the regional MPO for the Austin area decided to take major rail planning away from Capital Metro for the time by creating the transit working group (TWG).  The 15 member group would be made up of State Representatives, State Senators, Mayor Will Wynn, advocates, the University of Texas, and other groups.  This was on the heels of Wynn calling for a rail election in 2008, though as with most every other call for election in Austin's early rail history, that idea would not come to pass.  At this point the streetcar plan began its metamorphosis into the urban rail plan, with ROMA design taking up planning for alignments and continuing to push a Mueller alignment while also bringing in a Bergstrom Airport/Riverside alignment that was similar to other plans in the 1990s.  ROMA was attached to this planning because of their initial task of creating the Downtown Austin Plan.

2009-10 - Planning continued on Urban Rail and more alignments were discussed but it failed to go to the ballot again due to the lack of a financial plan.  Capital Metro, once rolling in cash, had drawn down its reserve to build the Red Line and thus stopped funding mobility projects with the quarter cent. (The sordid background tale is here).  Also, another state audit brought more news that the agency had been mismanaged under recently retired Fred Gilliam's watch and the board was restructured again to include someone with financial experience.  At this same time, Capital Metro did its first ever look at all the routes in the bus system calling it service plan 2020.  Ridership along the 1 route continued to outpace all others with over 17,000 including the 101 that will soon be replaced by 'Rapid Bus'. That is more than double the next highest ridership non UT line (7). The long awaited Red Line would open in 2010 to service just under 1,000 riders.

2011-2012 - And here we are. Still planning for urban rail and still trying to figure out how to pay for it.  The TWG continues to look at different corridors while the city focuses on Urban Rail.  In February, Todd Hemingson laid out the process at the TWG for planning future corridors but still not much mention of the most congested and highest ranking ridership corridor in the region. 

Ok, so, I apologize in advance if I missed something about the history above.  It's totally possible (I know there must be something missing) that I did considering the number of years and number of times rail has been close to being on the ballot, new alignments were drawn out etc.

 But here is what we hopefully learned.

1. None of the alignments that Capital Metro or the City of Austin are now discussing are new.  They've all been around for a long time (see images below).  So it stands to reason that the best corridor will always be the best corridor from a ridership and therefore political perspective.  (Future posts will cover this issue)
2. Capital Metro has always been a target of regional and state ire, whether coming from state representatives who thought they had too much money, from Austin when it didn't have the money anymore, and from the Statesman, who ever since the sales tax increase in the mid-90's has hacked away at the agency, sometimes because of mismanagement, and others because of reporters that don't know the difference between a catenary and a pantograph .
3. Mike Krusee was a genius.  He was able to get rail service for his constituents in Round Rock without making them pay for it.

As for alignment histories, take a look at the maps below.  All of these plans below are from the Austin Chronicle's archives.

1995 No map. But a discussion of the Current Red Line and "Rapid Fire" buses that would bring people to the places they couldn't get.

1997 Red Line Plan and Airport Link

2000 Alternatives with Riverside Line

2000 Regional Plan - Consultants Deemed Green Line Most Bang for Buck and the Feds confirmed that point.

 

2000 Light Rail Plan

2001 Rapid Transit Project

2004 All Systems Go

2006 Capital Metro Streetcar Project

 2008 Roma Design Urban Rail

2011 Urban Rail Plan

Next up... Politics of the Current Urban Rail alignment seen above...

Livermore Again

I keep writing about Livermore because it annoys me.  Do these opposition people not realize how bad it looks to fund a line in the middle of a freeway that will cost a billion dollars and only get about 5k to 10k riders? (I don't believe the happy ridership estimates they give in the alternatives analysis)  If you spend $500m on the 30th street BART station you'd get 15k riders and greater VMT reductions. Not that the locally preferred alternative is that much better, at least it goes to the center of Livermore, giving the city an opportunity to build up around it.

This brings about the point that there needs to be a serious discussion about how many riders our investments are getting for the money.  I know it's a bit more complicated than just riders and funding, but ultimately Livermore shows that we need more education on why connecting actual places is so important.  It gets riders, and allows a place decide its future.

Thursday Night Notes: Fake Trolleys and Blown Up Ridership Estimates

These articles are from a few days ago but I wanted to clear my tabs and get some opinions.

Ogden is going to spend some money on buses that they hope will stimulate streetcar ridership. While I've been impressed with the Broadway Shuttle in Oakland that recently started running given the short headways and fast access to Specialties bakery and Bakesale Betty from City Center, I have to wonder if people honestly think they are going to get a real estimate from these faux trolleys. (Calling them trolleys is a whole other can of worms I could get into in another post) It's understandable to want to know what is going to happen and spending less money to do it. But I'm convinced that given the completely different experience, you're almost dooming any streetcar to death by running the fake trolleys, especially if the headways are limited. Would like to hear more on this from others though.
~~~
I know we have to make ridership estimates for capital projects. Until recently ridership estimates made or broke your ability to build projects. So color me annoyed that Denver finally gets around to updating the regional land use estimates that boost ridership for the Fastracks plan. Should we think this estimate is correct? No. Ridership estimates will always be horrific when done using software built for estimating auto trips. Should Denver have gotten more federal money for the program? Yes. Given they are already underwater paying for it, why didn't they try to fix this earlier and get more than 20% from the Feds? Were they just lazy?

Regions that are doing these massive projects like LA, Seattle, Denver, Houston, and Salt Lake City should get more help from the feds. They have a plan and are moving forward with it. It's likely that these types of network expansions that make up the Transit Space Race will give more bang for the buck than one off single line expansions.
~~~
Here's an interesting article sent in by reader David. I'm always amazed at the different issues that places like Vancouver are dealing with than the majority of the United States in terms of ridership and development pressure along transit lines.
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Finally, there are tons of academic journals out there. They make you pay for their products and don't really care if only a few academics read them. But there's always interesting things to be found. Here are some links to Elsivier journals with a barrel of research on transport issues you all might care about. If you're RSS junkies like me, put them in your reader.

Pushkarev & Zupan on Employment & Ridership

This is always a chicken and egg fight but I'm starting to believe that the residential density argument is a bit misstated in terms of its impacts on transit ridership. Specifically since you're talking about housing density and not employment density. Charlotte's Uptown development had a larger part to do in transit ridership than residential density does along the corridor. And ultimately the cycle of building housing is going to create more demand, the employment was the initial draw. The transit agency just figured out how to serve it.

Over 60% of transit trips are for work (See Commuting in America III). This is compared to just under 20% of overall trips. This means that the focus on where people work is important in monocentric cities such as Nashville. I'm not saying that residential density is ultimately unimportant. But I believe its less important for starting a transit system and more important for growing it. There are lessons on this in previous research works that we tend to ignore.

To be honest I hadn't really read Zupan in full until more recently on account of there is just too much to read in general. But when I caught up on it, the findings are quite interesting and get you wondering if we've been looking at this whole transit and development thing all wonky. In their seminal work Public Transportation and Land Use Policy (1977), Jeff Zupan and Boris Pushkarev made the following observations based on the existing data at the time:

Pushkarev & Zupan Pg 174-175:

1. Clustering or dispersing nonresidential space. Suppose 10 million square feet are to be added to a growing urban area. One option is to put the floorspace into two highway oriented non residential clusters, each 5 million square feet in size. Another is to create a new downtown of 10 million sq ft. In the second case, per capita trips by transit within a 3 to 5 mile radius will be 50 to 70 percent higher than in the first case, keeping residential density the same.

2. Enlarging downtown size or raising nearby residential density. Suppose the options are to double the size of a downtown from 10 to 20 million square feet, or to double the residential density within a few miles of it from 15 to 30 du/acre. The former will increase per capita trips by transit three to four times more than the latter.

3. Increasing residential density near downtown or farther away. Suppose the options are to double non-residential density from 5 to 10 dwelling units per acre either within one mile of a downtown of 10 million square feet or at a distance of 10 miles from it. In the first case, public transit trips per capacity in the affected area will increase seventeen times as much as the second case.

4. Scattering apartments or concentrating them near transit. Suppose a rapid transit station is located 5 miles from a downtown of 50 million square feet of nonresidential floorspace (the 1976 size of Newark). At a density of 15 du/acre, the square mile surrounding the station will send about 620 trips a day downtown by transit. Suppose speculative development scatters apartments throughout the square mile, raising its density by 20%. This will increase transit ridership at the station by about 24 percent. Yet if the apartments are clustered within 2000 feet of the station, preserving the rest of the neighborhood intact, transit ridership will increase by 34% or more; at least a car load of 62 people a day will be added not from any increase in average density within the square mile, but only from a new arrangement of the new development within it.

"Thus land use policies which will do most for public transportation are those which will help cluster nonresidential floorspace in downtowns and other compact development patterns. Downtowns of 10 million square feet of gross non residential floorspace, if confined within less than one square mile, begin to make moderately frequent bus service possible and to attract an appreciable proportion of trips by transit. By contrast, downtowns of 5 million square feet can support only meager bus service. Spread suburban clusters of nonresidential use can only occasionally support meager bus service, if they contain shopping centers, or if they are surrounded by residential densities in excess of about 7 du/acre.

Residential density is less important for transit use than residential location, ie proximity to a downtown of substantial size or proximity to a rail transit line. If greater transit use is the goal, it is more important to put housing close to a downtown than make it high density. In fact, moderate residential densities in the range of 7-15 du/acre can support moderately convenient transit service by any of the transit modes reviewed in this book. Of course, densities higher than this will support better service, as well as more trips on foot. Thus, a strongly transit-oriented city such as Montreal has an average density of 35 dwellings per acre; attached two-family houses form an important part of its newly developed neighborhoods. Evidence from New York suggests that the shift from auto to transit diminishes, and reductions in total travel per capita cease, at densities above 100 du/acre. This density can be represented by 13 story apartment houses covering 20% of their site; on transportation grounds, there appears to be no need to exceed this density. It is important to emphasize, though, that a 13 story building located amid open fields will make no contribution to transit; it will only make a contribution if embedded in existing urban fabric, close to downtown or a rail station.”

All of this says that increasing your downtown size, and putting dense housing near downtown is likely to increase transit ridership. Now this goes so far when we're talking about polycentric regions and employment clusters that we see today such as Tyson's corner etc. But ultimately I think this work has lessons for those places as well. It will be interesting to see where the next decade of TOD research heads because ultimately I think this is a part of the research that needs to be explored in greater detail.

"We Don't Dwell"

Yay FTA Models. You totally rule at figuring out ridership in new light rail cities. You did a bang up job in Minneapolis (24K in 2020, current 26k), really got those Houston numbers right for 2020 (33k in 2020, current 38k), and Charlotte was right on target(9k opening, current 14k). Note: the APTA daily numbers are a bit wonky. I don't know if I completely trust them to the rider but they make the point.

Now we can add Phoenix to the list of FTA model lowballing:

The rail was projected to attract 26,000 riders per day, but the number is closer to 33,000, boosted in large part by weekend riders.

What kills me about all this lowballing, is what the cost effectiveness number was, and what it SHOULD have been. Ultimately that is what decides projects. And it's a little messed up that the FTA keeps getting it wrong, especially when they can kill a project because of a CE below Medium. Oh, and here's the money quote from the opponents:

Starlee Rhoades, the spokeswoman for the Goldwater Institute, a vocal critic of the rail’s expense. “I’ve taken it,” Ms. Rhoades said, slightly sheepishly. “It’s useful.” She and her colleagues still think the rail is oversubsidized, but in terms of predictions of failure, she said, “We don’t dwell.”
...
“We are also proponents of paying your own way, and we think the light rail remains too subsidized.”

That's right, you're in the New York Times saying the light rail is useful and full of people after you said no one would ride it. In fact, your institute is just like every other that goes around and spreads doom and gloom everywhere. And what is the fascination with subsidies? I guess I'll never get that end of the argument.

Monday Night Notes

I'm wondering if Austin ever did a real alternatives analysis for the center city line. I imagine its a no, and if so, they would do well to see where the highest ridership is. I'm guessing Guadalupe.
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Lots of people are taking light rail in Phoenix. However its not the usual work trip.

Metro found that only 27 percent of the patrons ride the light rail to and from work. In many large cities, commuters make up the dominant share of riders. The survey found that sports fans, shoppers and people going to and from the airport or cultural events form the largest group.

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Folks in Dallas are worried that the light rail line will make Richardson grow so fast that traffic will be horrendous.

Lots of development is going forward in Richardson, with much of it related to DART's rail service. But there's a downside to this good fortune: increased pressure on roadways. North Central Expressway is getting the big pounding.

I'm sure its all the transits fault.
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Too Full

The Hiawatha Line is chock full of riders. So much so that upgrades to the stations are underway to make them accessible to three car trains. The FTA models predicted that ridership on the line by 2020 would be 24,000. But now we're seeing that its 37,000 on some days. With more three car trains, I wonder if there will be an even greater ridership bump with more room on the trains. Back during the fight for LRT in Minneapolis, people were saying that this was the train to nowhere. Though it must be taking all those people somewhere!

Direct Result

A direct result of poor ridership estimation or purposeful underestimation for new lines is not enough capacity to supply service to the people that use the system. Minneapolis has decided to shut down parts of the Hiawatha line this weekend to lengthen the platforms for three car trains. This is going to happen on the South Corridor in Charlotte as well in time. It's unfortunate but this is something we're going to see in San Francisco on the Central Subway as well. Whoever thought cutting platform length to save money now instead of saving money later was a good idea was very very short sighted. These types of cost cutting decisions on the front end really need to stop.

72% Are Walking

72% of people who use the Orange Line in the R-B corridor walk to the stations.

Who Rides BART?

Update: More from Pedestrianist and Transbay Blog.

Lots of different people! The next question is how do they get to and from BART, and the answer is interesting. BART recently released a that releases data about who uses the system. I picked out some of what I feel is interesting data from the report:

1. The Majority of trips (88%) during peak hours were for work related trips. They break them out for mid day which is more even for other types of trips but certain stations have certain trip patterns such as shopping at Powell or medical at Rockridge and MacArthur.

2. 68% of BART riders have a car available to them and 21% of riders have parking available to them for free at their destination. However 42% of the folks who travel on BART only in the East Bay have access to free parking.

3. 58% of riders have been doing so for over a year.

4. What I found the most interesting, BART which was designed for the Automobile gets a large amount of car trips from home as the origin. Some places have less such as 18th Street which gets 81% of passengers from walking. 12% of people at Ashby bike to the station(Berkeley is full of more bikers to BART in general).

The reason the origin is interesting is the reason why the destination is interesting as well. The design of the system tells how it is being used. While designed for cars from the burbs, the areas that are urban get more walking trips. And the destinations are walking destinations too meaning that the more places we can connect with BART, the more people will take the line if close to employment. Also, if you have more urban stations, people use them for short trips.

5. BART Customers follow the makeup of the region in terms of income and ethnicity.

So there is much more information in there, but these were what I found most interesting. I think really it teaches us that we need to be intelligent in how we design systems. If we put more stations near destinations, more people will use the system.

Ridership Ahead in Phoenix

It's really not known when the initial novelty of the line wears off but I would say around 6 months you really know what you're gonna get. With that said, Phoenix is showing signs of promise at sticking to over 35% of projections.

Ridership for the Valley's new light-rail system appears to be stabilizing at a level well above expectations, Metro's chief executive officer said Wednesday. Although passenger counts for March were incomplete, Rick Simonetta cautioned, data collected through three and a half weeks show the average number of boardings during weekdays was more than 34,300.

Ridership Up But Most Likely Going Down

The boosterism behind the data is a little behind the reality on the ground. As employment drops so will ridership this next year, but APTA says that ridership in 2008 was at a 52 year high. That isn't bad but when you look at the per capita numbers its a bit of a different story.

The total is refreshing though. After some dismal time in the mid 90's when gas was sometimes 75 cents a gallon or less, ridership has been steadily increasing again. I'm sure it helped that a lot more resources could be put into transit which shows that what you invest in will be what people will be able to use, other than the other way around that the opponents would like you to think was true. Mainly, no one uses it because everyone likes to drive. But they never tell you how much we weren't inevesting in transit all those years as much as we are now.

In 1995 7.76 billion people took transit. $17.8 billion was spent on operating costs ($23.40 inflation adjusted to 2006). Fast forward to 2006 where we've spent $32.03 Billion on transit operating and accrued 10.01 billion trips. If we look at the changes in spending, 36.8% operations cost adjusted for inflation and 28.9% ridership increase and 31% increase in passenger miles. The greater we invest, the more we'll see people taking the options that work for them.

Phoenix Ridership to a Good Start

It's a little early to claim victory here because of all the special events that have been going on since this line opened as well as the "new" factor, but it looks promising. Current weekday ridership numbers are at 30,000 while the projections for opening day were at 26,000. Long term 2030 numbers are expected to be around 50,000. And hey, look! A low-medium cost-effectiveness rating! Again, today it takes a medium because of a 2005 Bush administration edict. This could turn into yet another ridership projection FAIL if the ridership stays at it's current level during a severe downturn.

Ridership projection FAIL = Cost Effectiveness Index FAIL.

Texas Ridership Down

The Houston Chronicle is reporting that ridership is down in Houston, Dallas, and Austin in the last three months. I don't understand why transit planners at these agencies are racking their brains wondering why transit ridership is down. I mean, the economy has nothing to do with it. Right?

And the reasons are not always readily apparent.

In one instance, DART officials were puzzled when ridership suddenly dried up in a Dallas neighborhood that had provided consistent business for years. It was determined that apartment closures were to blame.

I think we'll see more of this in the coming months.

One Million Riders

You know you want to say it like Dr. Evil. WMATA rocked it's all time high with an exclamation point. This was forcast by many before so it wasn't too much of a surprise, but its still an achievement. On that note, Richard has a post up about capacity and the additional costs of capacity and makes the case for those people paying more that use it at peak due to capacity built explicitly for peak travel instead of average travel.

At the same time, Ryan notes that this super ridership record should make the region think about increasing core capacity with new subway lines and streetcars. I tend to agree. More core capacity can only increase mobility and perhaps let out a bit of a relief valve. Other cities such as Budapest are still building core lines in the central city (like line 4, line 5), we should be doing that as well.

MLK Linkfest

It was a nice day today and I took a bit of a walk around my neighborhood looking for odd things, I'll get to that in the next post, but I had a few articles I needed to get out so here they are:
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Steve at Urban St. Louis has an amazing set of three aerial photos that show the degradation of MLK(before it was called such) over time due to "urban renewal" among other things. Check it out.
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Matt discusses the coming Metrocalypse during inauguration.
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India is talking high speed rail.
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Cleveland gets 6th annual ridership increase. Things going well.
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Richard Layman reposts a comment he originally left here about the WRI Purple Line study. Apparently the Shell Oil* funded think tank has been working on BRT studies around the world, but has never recommended light or heavy rail.
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An El Paso paper editorial states that a rail line should be on the cities to do list.
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A Dallas Morning News editorial calls for new buses to be CNG. How about more trolleybuses? Figure out a way to integrate the restructuring of the energy grid and the highest ridership routes in order to facilitate the reduction in particulate matter on the corridors and the long term alternative energy strategy. Buses are a 12 year investment, what will happen in 12 years? my guess is a lot.

Early Ridership Report from Phoenix

It's really too early to tell what the daily ridership will be, since the line is only a few weeks old, but here are some initial numbers, possibly heightened by the initial novelty, but lowered by the absence of college students at Arizona State.

The agency puts out its first official monthly totals in the middle of next month. But based on estimates, Metro believes its daily ridership from Monday of this week to today ranges from 20,000 to 30,000.

90,000 Riders on First Day

Big day for the Phoenix opening.

Q3 Transit Ridership Out

Expect to see these articles over the next few days. Below are links to ridership documents that haven't been updated on the APTA site quite yet (They'll be there Monday). 5% growth in transit ridership in Q3 (July to September) which is usually the heaviest ridership quarter of the year. Guess which mode has the highest ridership increase from percentage standpoint again. Light Rail at 10%. I'm not sure how they do the average weekday ridership calculations, but its interesting to see a lot of places in the 70,000 range that don't seem to get there often. Dallas, St. Louis, and Denver. Even Sacramento is close to 60k. Interesting.

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